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Abstract We investigate whether a profit-maximizing insurer with the opportunity to
modify the loss probability will engage in loss prevention or instead spend effort to
increase the loss probability. First we study this question within a traditional expected
utility framework; then we apply Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) loss aversion
model to account for reference-dependence in consumer preferences. Largely inde-
pendent of the adopted framework, we find that the profit-maximizing loss probability
for many commonly used parameterizations is close to 1/2. So in cases where the ini-
tial loss probability is low, insurers will have an incentive to increase it. This qualifies
appeals to grant insurersmarket power to incentivize them to engage in loss prevention.
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1 Introduction
An insurer’s profits depend on how much consumers are willing to pay for protection
against a potential loss in excess of the expected value of the policy, the risk pre-
mium. This risk premium in turn is a function of both the severity of the loss and the
probability that a loss happens. It seems only natural for profit-maximizing insurers
to influence either or both of these risk management parameters whenever possible.
Despite this connection, and in sharp contrast to the extensive literature that deals with
the insuree’s incentives to engage in self-protection and self-insurance,1 attention for
the loss-modification incentives by insurers has been very limited.
Two notable exceptions are the contributions by Schlesinger and Venezian (1986,
1990) who point out (1990, p. 84) that insurers often lobby Congress to implement
policies aimed at loss prevention (e.g. keep drunk drivers off the road) or loss reduction
(e.g. mandatory airbags and better bumpers on new automobiles). Within an expected-
utility framework with risk-averse consumers, they formalize the decision problem of
a risk-neutral monopolistic insurer who has the possibility to modify the status-quo
loss probability p0. When any loss modification efforts are costless, the insurer has
incentives to invest in loss prevention services prior to any insurance sales when
the status-quo probability p0 exceeds the profit-maximizing probability p∗. Because
the insurer always sets the risk premium such that the consumer’s utility when buying
insurance ismarginally higher than the expected utility of being uninsured, andbecause
the latter is decreasing in the loss probability, any reduction in loss probability will
unambiguously increase consumer welfare.
On the other hand, in case the status quo loss probability p0 is lower than the
profit-maximizing probability p∗, the interest of the insurer to increase the loss prob-
ability unambiguously goes against the interest of consumers. To illustrate, consider
the recent development of driverless cars. Automated vehicle technology is predicted
to reduce both the number of cars on the road and the number of fatal crashes.2 While
clearly benefiting consumers, the market for car insurance is likely to suffer.3 Indeed,
insurance companies like e.g. the Cincinnati Financial Corporation (2015) have started
warning in their SEC filings that self-driving cars pose a threat to their business: “Dis-
ruption of the insurance market caused by technology innovations such as driverless
cars that could decrease consumer demand for insurance products” (p. 111). Insurance
companies thus seem to have incentives to obstruct this development although direct
evidence that they actually do so is absent.4
1 Starting with Ehrlich and Becker (1972), see Christian Gollier and Treich (2013) and the references
therein.
2 RAND (2014) and The Economist (2015).
3 The RAND Corporation expresses this view in a recent study: “If these technologies reduce crashes
sufficiently, it is possible that the very need for specialized automobile insurance may disappear entirely.”
(Anderson et al. 2014, p. 115).
4 The Association of California Insurance Companies (ACIC) has advocated for changes “clarifying the
autonomous vehicle’s manufacturer retain all liability for damage, losses or injuries caused by the operation
of these vehicles as required by the enabling law (SB 1298)”. As the RAND authors note, such shifts in
liability from driver to manufacturer possibly lead to a “lower adoption of this technology than would be
socially optimal.” (Anderson et al. 2014, p. 118).
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In Schlesinger and Venezian’s work, this possibility receives relatively little atten-
tion, because it is “likely to meet with public resistance and possible regulatory
restraint” (Schlesinger and Venezian 1990).5 This view that society provides suffi-
cient checks and balances to prevent insurers from taking actions against the interest
of consumers may however prove too optimistic. Whereas insurers’ loss reduction
activities are easy to monitor because companies are happy to advertise them6, any
omitted loss-prevention activities or efforts to increase the loss probability are likely
to go unobserved. In this paper, we do not provide clear-cut empirical examples of
monopolistic insurers using their market power to obstruct threats that threaten their
product markets; our purpose is to show that this is not because it is not a theoretical
possibility.7
The final verdict on whether it is in the consumer’s interest to grant insurers market
power in specificmarkets therefore depends on the relative importance ofwelfare gains
of the increased bargaining power of insurers vis-à-vis providers and the welfare loss
due to the modification of loss probabilities.
In this paper,we calculate for a number of settings the value of the profit-maximizing
loss probability with the idea that the higher this value, the less likely it is that the
initial loss probability is even higher and the less likely that consumers would be better
off in an insurance market with less competition. First we consider the expected-utility
framework.We repeat the analysis in Schlesinger andVenezian (1990) for an economy
in which consumers are endowed with CARA preferences, which describes the case
where consumers face absolute losses.Nextwe describe the situationwhere consumers
haveCRRApreferences,which describes situationswhere they have to choosewhether
or not to insure against a potential loss proportional to their wealth. In both cases, the
optimal loss probabilities only come close to zero if consumers are highly risk averse
(CARA) or are highly risk averse and face the risk of losing a large fraction of their
initial wealth (CRRA).
In the secondpart of the paper,weuse themore recent loss aversion theory to analyze
the insurer’s problem of finding the optimal loss probability in case the consumers
have reference-dependent preferences.Weapply the reference-dependent utilitymodel
introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to extend our analysis of the insurer’s
loss prevention activities to situations where consumers have reference-dependent
preferences. This approach is novel and complements other contributions that study
the implications of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin framework on firm strategy and competition in
non-insurance markets (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi 2008, 2014; Carbajal and Ely 2014).
5 Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, p. 232) use a similar argument to limit the subsequent analysis (“for the
sake of concreteness”) to the case p∗ < p0.
6 For example, insurers provide a variety of loss preventions services to reduce the prob-
ability of car theft (http://www.aig.com/motor-fleet-loss-control_2538_367524.html) or the
number of hospital visits by offering free gym memberships to increase citizen’s enthusi-
asm for physical exercises (http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-12/politics/35439261_1_
gym-membership-medicare-advantage-health-insurance) or by offering free medical check-ups.
7 Even when the insurer has no means to raise the actual loss probability, it may be in his interest to try
to increase the subjective loss probability as perceived by consumers because a successful attempt will
increase his profits. Arguably, policy makers may counteract this by investing in (costly) programs to
increase consumer’s probability numeracy.
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Models of loss aversion have also been applied in the field of insurance, but most of
these contributions focus on the household’s decision-making problem rather than on
the implications for the optimal strategy for insurance companies (Hu and Scott 2007;
Sydnor 2010; Barseghyan et al. 2013).8
Our main finding is that in most commonly used specifications, the loss probability
that maximizes a monopolistic insurer’s profits is closer to 1/2 than to 0, independent
of whether we adopt an expected-utility framework or take the perspective of loss-
averse consumers. As a consequence, the instances where consumers are better off
in a monopolistic than in a competitive insurance market seem to be fairly few. For
this reason, our paper not only is an extension to the original work by Schlesinger
and Venezian (1986, 1990), but also serves as a useful counterweight to other papers
such as McKnight et al. (2012) that conclude that consumers may benefit from insurer
market power.9
2 Expected Utility Framework
This section dealswith the optimal loss-size problem in the expected utility framework.
We assume that consumers are risk-averse with a twice differentiable utility function
of final wealth W with U
′
(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0. The monopolistic insurer is risk-
neutral. We follow Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, 1990) and consider only full
coverage insurance and assume complete information for both parties. This allows
us to abstract away from issues of deductibles, moral hazard and adverse selection.
Whereas they consider both the case where loss prevention activities can be bundled
with an insurance policy and the case where the insurers can alter the loss probability
only before selling insurance, we focus on the latter case.
Consider a monopolistic insurance market where consumers have a wealth W and
face a wealth prospect W − x where W is the present value of lifetime income and x
a binary random variable that takes the value L with probability p and 0 otherwise.
A key element of our model is that the insurer has the ability to costlessly change p.
Consumer i will buy insurance if and only if:
Ui (W − R) ≥ (1 − p)Ui (W ) + pUi (W − L), (1)
with R denoting the premium.10 The insurer’s decision problem is to set the premium
R and the loss probability p at values that maximize the insurer’s expected profits:
π(p) = (R − pL)
N∑
i=1
I [Ui (W − R) ≥ (1 − p)Ui (W ) + pUi (W − L)], (2)
8 Barberis (2013) contains a summary of this literature.
9 In their empirical study, McKnight et al. (2012) find that insurers pay less than the uninsured for certain
health services and conclude from this that “market power for insurers can offset provider market power
(p. 10)”.
10 We assume that when consumers are indifferent between taking insurance or not, they choose to insure.
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Fig. 1 The expected profit maximizing loss probability p∗
where N denotes population size and I [·] is an indicator function.Thefirst termdenotes
the expected profit per insuree and the summation gives the aggregate demand for
insurance. Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, 1990) focus on the case where consumers
have identical risk preferences. In this case, demand for insurance is either N or 0
for any (R, p)-combination. For any given p, a profit-maximizing insurer will set the
price of the policy R(p) such that U (W − R) = (1 − p)U (W ) + pU (W − L). That
is
R(p) = W − U−1[U (W ) − p(U (W ) − U (W − L))] = W − CE(p), (3)
with CE(p) denoting the certainty equivalent to the wealth prospect W − x . This price
equals the actuarial value of the policy, pL (i.e. the expected loss), plus a fixed fee equal
to the consumer’s risk premium.11 For this general setup, Schlesinger and Venezian
(1986) show that for any loss size L < W , there exists a unique loss probability p∗ that
maximizes the insurer’s expected profit.12 This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
monopolistic insurer has incentives to invest in loss prevention activities whenever p∗
is smaller than the status-quo probability p0 in the market. In a perfectly competitive
market, insurers lack such an incentive, because any increase in margin due to these
activities will be immediately competed away. Whether consumers are better off in a
monopolistic or a competitive market thus depends on whether any reduction in loss
probability compensates for the policy being priced above its actuarial value in the
monopoly market.
11 For concave utility functions it follows from Jensen’s inequality that U (W − pL) ≥ pU (W − L) +
(1 − p)U (W ) which is equivalent to W − pL ≥ U−1[pU (W − L) + (1 − p)U (W )] because of U ′ > 0.
Thus R(p) = W − U−1[pU (W − L) + (1 − p)U (W )] ≥ pL . That is, for any p, R(p) is such that the
insurer’s expected profits R(p) − pL are non-negative.
12 It also follows from the strict concavity of the utility function that π ′′(p) < 0. That is, that there are no
local maxima besides p∗, cf. Schlesinger and Venezian (1990, p. 85 equation (5)).
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2.1 Absolute Risks
Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) present a quantitative analysis of their model. Their
setting can be thought of as one where consumers have to choose between a lottery
 = p ◦ −L ⊕ (1 − p) ◦ 0 or avoiding the lottery by paying R(p). That is, con-
sumers go uninsured against the risk to lose an absolute sum L with probability p or
they buy insurance. Schlesinger and Venezian assume a representative consumer with
preferences that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
U (W ) = 1 − e−θW (4)
with θ > 0 the level of risk aversion. CARA preferences makes the decision to insure
independent of a consumer’s initial wealth level W .
For convenience, we repeat their main results. For a given loss size L , the loss




eθ L − 1 (SV.5)
Whether consumers are better off in an imperfectly or perfectly competitive market
not only depends on the sign of the difference between the optimal and status-quo loss-
probability (p∗ and p0) but also on themagnitude of the risk premium an insurer is able
to charge when he has market power. Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) show that when
the status-quo loss-probability p0 exceeds (is lower than) a critical loss probability
pc, consumers are better (worse) off in terms of expected utility in a market with a
loss probability p∗ and a monopolistically priced policy than in a competitive market
where insurance is sold at the actuarial value of the policy (that is, at the expected loss
p0L , with a zero risk premium).
In the case of CARA preferences, this critical probability pc equals
pc ≡ p∗ + (R(p∗) − p∗L)/L . (SV.6)
Note that pc L = R(p∗). The term on the left hand side is the actuarially fair price
consumers pay for coverage in a competitive market with loss probability pc, the right
hand side the monopolistically priced policy with loss probability p∗. Figure 2 depicts
the optimal and critical loss probabilities for different loss sizes L . The left panel shows
that the optimal probability is decreasing in the potential loss L consumers face. One





∗(θ) = 1/2, lim
L→∞ p
∗(θ) = 0 (θ > 0).
13 Schlesinger and Venezian (1990, p. 88) already mention this result in passing without giving a formal
proof.
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Fig. 2 Plots of p∗(θ) (left panel) and pc(θ) (right panel) under different calibrations of L = 20, 40, 60, 80
and 100 for θ ∈ [0.01, 0.99]
Proof All proofs are in the “Appendix”. unionsq
So, independent of the consumers’ level of risk aversion, the insurer has an interest
in pushing down the status-quo loss probability as long as the loss L is sufficiently
large; think of, for example, hospital expenses. For small losses, the insurer has an
incentive to inflate the status-quo loss probability to the detriment of consumers unless
one believes that the status-quo loss probability exceeds 0.5. Although hard evidence
is absent, we do observe that insurance against small losses is often offered at a high
price compared to the coverage. This implies that anyone who buys such policies is
either extremely risk averse or perceives the loss as highly likely to happen to him or
her.14
The left panel of Fig. 2 shows that for given L , the optimal loss probability is
decreasing in θ . This is because in selecting the loss probability, the insurer has to
trade-off the negative effect of decreasing p on consumers’willingness to pay (insuring
against a loss is more valuable the higher the expected loss) against the positive impact
a lower loss probability has on the fraction of clients suffering an actual loss (which
reduces the insurer’s cost). For CARAutility and a given loss L , when society becomes
more risk-averse the second effect dominates, such that the insurer lowers p when
people become more risk-averse.
The right panel of Fig. 2 shows the critical loss probabilities for different loss sizes
L . Note that for all values of L and θ , the status-quo probability has to exceed 0.5 for
consumers to be better off in a monopoly market. In most cases it has to be higher
than 0.7. For example, for θ = 0.3 and L = 40, pc ≈ 0.79 and p∗ ≈ 0.08. Why
are consumers not better off in a monopoly market despite the impressive reduction
in loss probability? The reason is that the monopolistic insurer sets the price of the
policy equal to the price that would be obtained under competition with the higher
loss probability: R(0.08) = pc L ≈ 31.7. Figure 3 illustrates this point by showing
the ratio between the actual price of the policy R(p∗) and its actuarial value p∗L .
For L = 5, the risk premium seems reasonable, but as L increases, consumers are
14 For example, a two-year insurance that covers breakage of prescription glasses with a value up to £100
costs £9 (http://www.visionexpress.com/glasses/buyers-guide/breakage-protection/).
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Fig. 3 Plot of the R(p∗)/(p∗L) ratio for the loss sizes L = 20, 40, 60, 80, 95 and 100 and initial wealth
W = 100
willing to pay a premium dozens of times the actuarial value, which implies absurdly
high degree of risk aversion. This result is a direct consequence of the observation
first made by Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) that under CARA utility, the
refusal of small bets implies absurd levels of risk aversion for large bets. In sum, when
consumers are endowed with CARA preferences, the instances where they are better
off in a monopolistic than a competitive insurance market seem to be fairly few.
2.2 Proportional Risks
We next extend the analysis to the case where consumer preferences are characterized
by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). CRRA models are more common than
CARA in the recent literature of insurance markets.15 CRRA utility is given by
U (W ) =
{
W 1−θ /(1 − θ) for θ = 1,
ln W for θ = 1. (7)
Since offering insurance is only profitable if there are risk-averse individuals, we limit
attention to the case θ > 0, ruling out situations where θ = 0 (risk-neutrality) or
θ < 0 (risk-seeking).
After inserting (7) into the profit function (2) and taking the derivative with respect
to p, we obtain the following general expression for the profit-maximizing loss prob-
15 Just to mention some recent examples, Barseghyan et al. (2013), Sydnor (2010), Kaplan and Violante
(2010) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008) have all applied CRRA utility to describe risk aversion and
insurance choice.
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W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ . (8)
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the situation in which consumers face
a loss proportional to their initial or discounted lifetime wealth, L = δW . In other
words, they face a lottery of the form  = p ◦ −δW ⊕ (1 − p) ◦ 0. This seems an
appropriate description for decisions concerning e.g. home insurance. With potential
losses proportional to wealth, the optimal probability becomes wealth independent










B−1 with B = 1 − (1 − δ)1−θ . (9)
We have the following result:
Result 2 1. limθ→0 p∗(θ)
∣∣∣
δ=1 = 1 − e
−1,
2. p∗(1/2) = 1/2,
3. limδ→1 p∗(θ) = 1 − (1 − θ) 1−θθ ,
4. limδ→0 p∗(θ) = 1/2.
It is most insightful to discuss the implications of these properties together with
Fig. 4 that shows the development of the optimal and critical loss probabilities for
different values of θ and δ.17 As for CARA utility, we observe that p∗ is decreasing
with the level of risk-aversion among the population. The right panel of Fig. 4 shows
that for all sizes of the potential loss and all levels of risk aversion, the status-quo
probability has to exceed 0.5 for consumers to be better off in a monopoly market.
Again, the instanceswhere consumers are better off in amonopolistic insurancemarket
seem few.
16 Insert (7) and (3) into profit function (2), taking first-order condition and we arrive at
π(p) = R(p) − pL = W − CE(p) − pL = W − U−1[U (W ) − p(U (W ) − U (W − L))] − pL
= W − (W 1−θ − p(W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ )) 11−θ − pL;
π ′(p) = − 1
1 − θ (W
1−θ − p(W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ )) 11−θ −1(−W 1−θ + (W − L)1−θ ) − L = 0
⇒ (W 1−θ − p(W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ )) 11−θ −1 = L(1 − θ)








W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ .
17 We would like to point out that, other than ease of exposition, there no reason to neglect values of θ > 1
(see Wakker 2008, p. 1330-1332).
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Fig. 4 Plots of p∗(θ) (left panel) and pc(θ) (right panel) for δ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.95 and 1
The left panel of Fig. 4 and Result 2 show that for values of the risk aversion
parameter θ ≤ 1/2, p∗(θ) ≥ 1/2, ∀δ. That is, a monopolistic insurer will not have
any incentive whatsoever to push loss probabilities below 0.5 if consumers are only
mildly risk averse. Moreover, according to property 4, the optimal loss probability is
0.5 for any level of risk aversion in the limiting case δ ↓ 0. The figure shows that
only in case of δ ≥ 0.95 and high levels of risk aversion, the optimal loss probability
drops to values importantly lower than 0.5. The reason is that in this case, a lowering
of the loss probability only has a very limited impact on the price the insurer can
charge while significantly reducing the expected cost. Wakker (2008) mentions that
when large amounts of money are at stake, utility functions with θ > 1 tend to best
fit empirical data, implying that high-δ/high-θ combinations may not be that rare in
practice, see also Hartley et al. (2014).
The right panel of Fig. 4 shows that, as in the CARA case, for any level of risk
aversion and loss size, the status-quo probability has to exceed 0.5 for consumers to
be better off in a monopoly market. The instances that give the insurer the strongest
incentives to reduce the loss probability are exactly those for which the status-quo
probability has to be very high in order for consumers to benefit from being in a
monopolistic instead of a competitive market. So also for CRRA utility, we conclude
that consumers are better off in a monopolistic insurance market only when the poten-
tial loss is close to one’s initial wealth and consumers have a high index of relative
risk aversion.
2.2.1 Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes
So far, we have assumed representative consumers. Insurers however operate in mar-
kets where consumers differ in their risk attitudes and for this reason, we now lift
the assumption to see how this will affect our results.18 Since there is no closed form
solution for p∗(θ) in this case, we revert to simulation and present numerical results.
18 We assume that the insurer only knows the distribution f (θ) of θ such that he cannot engage in first-
degree price discrimination.
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Table 1 The simulation results for CRRA utility with θ ∼ N (0.4, 0.1)
Loss size (δ) Probability Premium Profit Percentage
p∗ SE R SE π(p∗) SE Insured SE
0.01 0.490 (0.00) 0.49 (0.01) 0.30 (0.00) 79.13 (1.30)
0.05 0.490 (0.01) 2.46 (0.04) 8.10 (0.12) 81.02 (1.24)
0.10 0.491 (0.01) 4.95 (0.09) 33.30 (0.48) 83.16 (1.19)
0.20 0.493 (0.01) 10.03 (0.15) 141.10 (2.06) 81.86 (2.61)
0.40 0.500 (0.01) 20.78 (0.32) 644.30 (9.35) 82.08 (2.45)
0.60 0.504 (0.01) 32.32 (0.47) 1704.40 (24.63) 81.75 (2.53)
0.80 0.518 (0.01) 46.14 (0.44) 3842.50 (56.31) 81.79 (2.54)
0.90 0.528 (0.00) 54.66 (0.43) 5820.40 (86.24) 81.47 (2.53)
0.99 0.550 (0.01) 66.48 (0.54) 9668.00 (150.09) 80.26 (2.63)
Standard errors in parentheses
In line with Holt and Holt and Laury (2002), who estimate the coefficient of risk
aversion for most subjects in a laboratory experiment to be in the 0.3–0.5 range, we
draw individual risk preferences θi from the distribution N (0.4, 0.1). To find the dis-
tribution of profit maximizing (R(p∗), p∗)-combinations for a given proportional loss
δ, we follow a three-step procedure: First we generate a total of N = 1000 consumers
(θ1, θ2, . . . , θ1000), with θ j independent draws from N (0.4, 0.1). Each consumer has
initial wealth fixed at W = 100. Second we determine for each given loss probability
p the optimal premium by calculating the quantity sold and profits obtained for each
possible value of the premium R ∈ [pL : 0.01 : W ]; we then repeat this step for
each probability p ∈ P = {0, 0.01, . . . , 1.00} and select the probability p∗ for which
π(p∗, R(p∗)) ≥ π(p′, R(p′)), ∀p′ ∈ P . We repeat these three steps 1, 000 times in
order to arrive at distributions of the optimal p∗ and other market characteristics such
as the percentage of consumers that takes out insurance and consumer welfare.
Table 1 gives the simulation results for different values of δ. The table shows that,
similar to the homogeneous CRRA case with θ < 0.5, the optimal loss probability is
increasing in δ but close to one half for all values of δ considered. The equilibrium
fraction of consumers insured is very similar for different values of δ. Figure 5 shows
for δ = 0.2 the simulated distributions of the optimal loss probability p∗, the insurer’s
profits, the premium R(p∗) set and the number of consumers that decides to buy
insurance.
3 Reference-Dependent Utility
In the expected-utility model, recent changes in wealth do not affect the utility one
derives from one’s current wealth. That is, a wealth level of $2 million gives you the
same utility independent of whether you gained $1million or lost $3million compared
to yesterday. This limited framework is unable to explain risk aversion over relatively
small stakes because anything but virtually risk neutrality over small stakes implies
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absurd risk aversion over larger stakes (Rabin 2000). Samuelson (2005, p. 90) notes
that although this is the common way expected utility appears in theoretical models,
there are no fundamental objections to definingutility over initialwealth and changes in
wealth. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop such amodel of reference-dependent
utility in which the utility derived from a riskless wealth outcome consists of two com-
ponents: an intrinsic “consumption utility” which is a function of the wealth outcome
only, plus a reference-dependent gain-loss utility. Subsequent studies have applied
this model to topics as disparate as cross-country differences in trust levels (Bohnet
et al. 2010), a monopolistic firm’s pricing strategies when consumers have reference-
dependent preferences (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi 2014; Carbajal and Ely 2014), price
variation and competition intensity (Heidhues andKo˝szegi 2008) and dynamicmodels
of consumption plans (Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2009). This section analyzes the behavior
of a profit-maximizing insurer who can influence loss probabilities in the reference-
dependent utility framework. Our objective is to see whether the main finding of the
previous section—the profit-maximizing loss probability is around 0.5 for commonly
observed levels of risk aversion—is upheld in the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) model.19
The key element of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) is that a person’s utility not only
depends on her riskless wealth outcome w ∈ R, but also on a riskless reference level
of wealth r ∈ R.20 A representative consumer’s total utility is given by
u(w|r) ≡ m(w) + μ(m(w) − m(r)), (10)
with the term m(w) the intrinsic consumption utility and the term μ(m(w) − m(r))
the reference-dependent gain-loss utility. The model assumes that the reference point
r relative to which a consumer evaluates an outcome is stochastic because a consumer
may be uncertain about outcomes. When w is drawn according to the probability
measure F(·), utility is given by
U (F |G) =
∫ ∫
u(w|r)dG(r)d F(w). (11)
The model makes the simplifying assumption that preferences are linear in prob-
abilities: For a given reference point, the stochastic wealth outcome is evaluated
according to its expected reference-dependent utility. This in contrast to prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Barberis 2013) that allows decision weights to
be a non-linear function of the objective probabilities in order to accommodate the
commonly observed phenomenon that people tend to overweigh small probabilities
and underweigh large probabilities.21
As in the previous section, consumers have to decide whether they wish to face
the risk of losing L of their initial wealth W with probability p or to buy insurance
19 Sydnor (2010, Section F) contains a nice discussion how standard prospect theory cannot fully explain
insurance purchases, but newer models such as Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), can.
20 The difference between the models introduced in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) is that utility in the
latter depends on a multi-dimensional consumption bundle and reference bundle. We follow Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2007), which uses a version with a one-dimensional utility function.
21 This simplification may lead us to underestimate the demand for insurance for low-probability losses.
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against this risk by paying a premium R. To close the model, one needs to determine
the appropriate reference point. Although there is little empirical evidence on the
determinants of reference points, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) make the case for
a rational expectations assumption: A person’s reference point has to be consistent
with the beliefs about the outcome this person held in the recent past. For example, an
employee who had been expecting a salary of $100,000 and should assess a salary of
$90,000 not as a gain but as a loss.22
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) distinguish between unanticipated and anticipated risks.
Given our context, the case where agents anticipate the exposure to risk seem most
appropriate. In these situations, the agent correctly predicts the choice set she faces.
Within this class, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) distinguish between UPE/PPE risk atti-
tudes and CPE risk attitudes.
In the unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE), the time between the decision
(take insurance or not) and the outcome (a loss occurs or not) is sufficiently short that
the agent does not adapt her expectations. That is, she will evaluate the gain-loss utility
of the outcome relative to the expected outcomewithout coverage, and the agent knows
she will evaluate outcomes this way (the rational expectations assumption). Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2007) mention insurance choice for short-term rentals such as cars and
skis as examples.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) give an example for L = 100, p = 0.5 and R = 55. In
deciding whether or not to take insurance, the agent will infer that a) taking insurance
by paying 55 will induce either feeling of losing 55 with probability 1 − p = 0.5 (in
case no loss occurs) or a feeling of gaining 45 (in case a loss does occur); b) not taking
insurance will either lead to a mixed feeling of status quo and gaining 100 (in case
no loss occurs) or a mixed feeling of status quo and loosing 100 (in case a loss does
occur).
In the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE), it is assumed that the time
between the moment of deciding and the moment of the outcome is sufficiently long
to adapt expectations. That is, if the agent decides not to take insurance, this choice
will determine her reference point at the time the relevant wealth outcome occurs
and the possibility that she could have taken insurance does not enter the gain-loss
calculation.23 If she decides to take insurance, this will determine her reference point
and the possibility that she could have chosen not to insure does not enter the gain-loss
calculation. This situation adequately describes choice for travel and flight insurance.
To return to the numerical example, the agent will rightly infer that (a) taking
insurance by paying 55 will not lead to any gain-loss utility because at the moment of
the outcome, the risk that was once there will be forgotten; (b) not taking insurance
will, just as in the UPE situation either lead to amixed feeling of status quo and gaining
100 (in case no loss occurs) or a mixed feeling of status quo and loosing 100 (in case
a loss does happen).
22 Their main reasons for assuming rational expectations are that it maintains modeling discipline and that
there is empirical evidence indicating that reference points are influenced by expectations (Post et al. 2008).
23 Phrased a bit differently, the CPE is defined as the decision that maximizes expected utility given that it
determines both the reference lottery and the outcome lottery (Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2007).
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So, compared to UPE, taking insurance will be more attractive in a CPE context
because it is never felt as a loss. The implication of the insurance being relatively
more attractive is that agents are more risk averse when they anticipate a risk and the
possibility to buy insurance coverage. We now continue with calculating the optimal
loss probabilities under UPE and CPE.
3.1 Optimal Loss Probability Under UPE Risk Attitudes
In the remainder of this section, we assume that the consumption utility is linear,
m(w) = w. This is a reasonable assumption for modest scale risks. If being insured
is the reference point, the expected utility of a consumer with initial endowment W
who decides to buy insurance by paying a premium R equals
U (F |F) =
∑∑
u(w|r) f (w) f (r)drdw
= f (W − R) f (W − R)[m(W − R) + μ(m(W − R) − m(W − R))]
= m(W − R), (12)
where the last equality follows because (i) in case of being covered, there is no uncer-
tainty in the final wealth received, f (W − R) = 1; (ii) if being insured is the reference
point, the probability measure of the reference point has mass 1 at W − R as well.
There is no feeling of loss or gaining in this case.
If being insured is the reference point but the consumer decides not to buy insurance,
her expected utility is:
U (F ′|F) =
∑∑
u(w|r) f ′(w) f (r)drdw
= f ′(W − 0) f (W − R)[m(W ) + μ(m(W ) − m(W − R))]
+ f ′(W − L) f (W − R)[m(W − L) + μ(m(W − L) − m(W − R))]
= (1 − p)[m(W ) + μ(m(W ) − m(W − R))]
+ p[m(W − L) + μ(m(W − L) − m(W − R))], (13)
where the last equality follows from f ′(W −L) = 1− f ′(W ) = p and f (W −R) = 1:
without insurance, the wealth outcome is W − L with probability p and (W − L)
otherwise; the reference point is (W − R) with probability 1. Applying Ko˝szegi and
Rabin’s (2007) definition, the decision to buy insurance is an UPE if U (F |F) ≥
U (F ′|F).
Assuming that consumers will buy insurance whenever the expected utility of being
insured is at least as large as the expected utility of not being insured, a risk-neutral
monopolistic insurer who aims to maximize expected profits will set the loss probabil-
ity p such that R− pL ismaximal, conditional onU (F |F) ≥ U (F ′|F). In order to find
an explicit solution for p∗, we use the same parametrization of the reference-dependent
gain-loss utility μ(·) as Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007): μ(x) = ηx for x > 0, and
μ(x) = ηλx for x ≤ 0, with η > 0 the relative weight that consumers attach to
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gain-loss utility, and λ > 1 the coefficient of loss aversion. Given this specification:
U (F |F) ≥ U (F ′|F) ⇔ W − R ≥ (1 − p)[W + ηR] + p[W − L − λη(L − R)]
⇔ W − R ≥ W + (1 − p)ηR − pL − pλη(L − R).
We arrive at the following result (a detailed derivation is provided in Appendix 1):
Result 3 In an economy where consumers’ attitude towards risk is characterized by




(1 + λη)(1 + η) − η − 1
η(λ − 1) , (14)
and the corresponding price of the insurance is
R(p∗) = L(1 + λη)(
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) − η − 1)




1 + η . (15)
One easily sees that λ > 1 guarantees positive expected profits per insuree, R(p∗) −
p∗L . Note that, different from the expected-utility framework, the loss size L does not
appear as an argument. A number of other properties of p∗ are stated in the following
corollary.





2. limη↓0 p∗ = 1/2.




The first property says that the optimal loss probability is decreasing with the relative
importance of the gain-loss utility. Taken together, the properties inform us that for







. Empirical studies typically find estimates of the loss
aversion parameter λ of around 2.25 (Kahneman et al. 1990; Tversky and Kahneman
1992; Gill and Prowse 2012). Such an estimate implies a lower bound for the optimal
loss probability of 0.4. So, again, we find values of p∗ much closer to 1/2 than to 0.
Another possible UPE is the situation where no insurance is the reference point
and the decision not to buy insurance gives the consumer a higher expected utility
than buying insurance, that is: U (F ′|F ′) ≥ U (F |F ′). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)
propose that in cases with multiple equilibria, an individual will choose her “favorite”
equilibrium, the one that gives the highest ex ante expected utility if followed through.
This leads to the concept of ‘preferred personal equilibrium’ (PPE) as an equilibrium
selection mechanism: the PPE is the most preferred UPE. In our case, deciding to buy
insurance is a PPE if U (F |F) ≥ U (F ′|F ′). The assumption of profit-maximization
by the insurer rules out that U (F |F) < U (F ′|F ′) because in that case, the insurer’s
profits would be zero and because—as we will show in the next section—there is
always a feasible loss probability p such that his expected profits are non-negative and
U (F |F) ≥ U (F ′|F ′) holds.
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3.2 Optimal Loss Probability Under CPE Risk Attitudes
One of the implications of Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s model is that buying insurance is
more attractive when consumers have CPE instead of UPE risk attitudes. This implies
that insurers are better off when consumers can buy insurance well ahead of time.
We explore this possibility in this section. The expected utility of taking insurance
U (F |F) does not change and equals (12). The expected utility of the decision not to
buy insurance, given that the reference point is also “no insurance”, equals
U (F ′|F ′) =
∑∑
u(w|r) f ′(w) f ′(r)drdw
= f ′(W − 0) f ′(W − 0)[m(W − 0) + μ(m(W − 0) − m(W − 0))]
+ f ′(W − 0) f ′(W − L)[m(W − 0) + μ(m(W − 0) − m(W − L))]
+ f ′(W − L) f ′(W − 0)[m(W − L) + μ(m(W − L) − m(W − 0))]
+ f ′(W − L) f ′(W − L)[m(W − L) + μ(m(W − L) − m(W − L))]
= (1 − p)2m(W ) + p2m(W − L)
+ p(1 − p)[m(W ) + m(W − L) + μ(m(W ) − m(W − L))
+ μ(m(W − L) − m(W ))].
(16)
Without insurance, the wealth outcome is W with probability f ′(W ) = 1 − p and
(W − L) with probability f ′(W − L) = p. The reference point is ‘no insurance’ in
which case the outcome is also W with probability (1 − p) and (W − L) otherwise.
Buying insurance is a CPE if U (F |F) ≥ U (F ′|F ′) for all F ′. The monopolistic
insurer sets p such that the expected profits are maximized under the condition that
U (F |F) ≥ U (F ′|F ′). Equating U (F ′|F ′) in Eq. (16) to U (F |F) in Eq. (12) shows
that in equilibrium, the expected profit margin of the insurer equals
R − pL = −p(1 − p)[μ(L) + μ(−L)]
In prospect theory, the gain-loss utility is assumed concave in the region of gains but
convex in the region of losses. This property of diminishing sensitivity implies that
μ(+L) + μ(−L) < 0 such that expected profits are maximized when p∗ = 1/2. We
state this result formally:
Result 4 In an economy where consumers’ attitude towards risk is characterized by
CPE, the loss probability p∗ that maximizes the expected-profits of a monopolistic
insurer equals 1/2.
Note that this result is reached without assuming any specific parametrization for the
gain-loss utility function. Figure 6 provides some intuition for this result. In the figure,
the loss-averse utility function U (F ′|F ′) of Eq. (16) is convex with respect to p.24
When p = p∗, an individual’s utility equalsU (p∗) if she is loss-averse and (W − p∗L)
24 Because we assume linear consumption utility, plotting the wealth level at the horizontal axis, as in
Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, Figure 1) leads to linear utility curves. For this reason, we use the decision
variable p as the variable at the horizontal axis.
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Fig. 6 CPE risk attitudes and the risk premium with linear consumption utility
if risk-neutral. Since we assume linear consumption utility, the certainty equivalent
equals CE(p) = U (CE(p)). Thus the expected profit equals the distance marked
by the vertical dotted line. The optimal loss probability p∗ maximizes the distance
between U (F ′|F ′) and the expected wealth line W − pL , which is the point p where
U ′(p) equals the slope of the expectedwealth line,which is−L . Thismaximal distance
is attained when p∗ = 1/2 because U ′(F ′|F ′) = −L + (1 − 2p)[μ(L) + μ(−L)].
For the specific parametrization μ(x) = ηx for x > 0 and μ(x) = ληx for x ≤ 0,
the profit maximizing premium and profits are equal to










ηL(λ − 1). (18)
To show that U ′(F ′|F ′) is convex, take the first order and second order derivatives w.r.t. p:
U ′(F ′|F ′) = −2(1 − p)W + 2p(W − L) + (1 − 2p)[2W − L + μ(L) + μ(−L)]
= −L + (1 − 2p)[μ(L) + μ(−L)];
U ′′(F ′|F ′) = −2[μ(L) + μ(−L)].
Because μ(L) > 0, μ(−L) < 0 and |μ(L)| < |μ(−L)|, U ′′(F ′|F ′) > 0 and thus U (F ′|F ′) is convex.
When 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 , U ′(F ′|F ′) < 0 for sure; when 12 < p ≤ 1, we have
U ′(F ′|F ′) = 0 ⇒ pˆ = 1
2
− L
2[μ(L) + μ(−L)] .
For 12 < p < pˆ, U
′(F ′|F ′) < 0; and for pˆ < p ≤ 1, U ′(F ′|F ′) > 0. The utility function first decreases
in p and then increases after some point pˆ > 12 .
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Table 2 Numerical example of the optimal loss probability and premium when L = 10, λ = 2.25, and
consumers have either UPE or CPE risk attitudes
η UPE CPE
p∗ R(p∗) π R(p
∗)
p∗L p
∗ R(p∗) π R(p
∗)
p∗L
0.1 0.487 5.13 0.27 1.06 0.5 5.31 0.31 1.06
0.5 0.457 5.43 0.87 1.19 0.5 6.56 1.56 1.31
1 0.440 5.60 1.21 1.27 0.5 8.13 3.13 1.63
5 0.412 5.88 1.77 1.43 0.5 20.63 15.63 4.13
10 0.406 5.94 1.88 1.46 0.5 36.25 31.25 7.25
50 0.401 5.99 1.97 1.49 0.5 161.25 156.25 32.25
100 0.401 5.99 1.99 1.50 0.5 317.50 312.50 63.50
The premium R∗ is increasing in theweight of the gain-loss utility in the utility function
and in λ. This means that, in line with intuition, the more an individual weighs losses
relative to gains, the higher the profit an insurer can attain.
Our result that p∗ = 1/2 when consumers have CPE risk attitudes is qualitatively
similar to the results for UPE risk attitudes and for the expected utility model. Com-
pared to the UPE case individuals are more inclined to take out insurance because they
are more risk-averse when they can commit to the choice ahead of time. The model we
discuss in this section only considers a representative agent economy. Note however
that for CPE risk attitudes, heterogeneity in either η or λ does not change our result
because p∗ does not depend on these values.
3.3 Numerical Example
We conclude this section with a numerical example. Assume that the consumer with a
gain-loss coefficient λ = 2.25 has to decide whether or not to insure against a risk that
leads to a loss L = 10 with probability p∗. Table 2 compares for different values of η
the expected-profit maximizing loss probability p∗ and premium for the case where
consumers have UPE risk attitudes with the case where they have CPE risk attitudes.
The table also gives the expected profits per insuree and the ratio of the premium
charged (R(p∗)) and the actuarial value of the policy (p∗L).
In line with the analytical results, the numerical results show that as the gain-loss
utility receives higher weight, the optimal loss probability decreases in the UPE case.
The premium and expected profits are increasing in η, both for UPE as for CPE.
Table 2 confirms that the monopolistic insurer is able to attain higher expected profits
when consumers have CPE preferences. This difference is very sizable: whereas in the
UPE case the premium rises to about 1.5 times the actuarial value, it rises to 63 times
the actuarial value in the CPE case. This is reminiscent of our earlier findings for the
expected utility model were consumers were endowed with CARA preferences (see
Fig. 3).
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4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper follows up on the original contributions by Schlesinger andVenezian (1986,
1990) who first investigated the incentives for loss-modification by profit-maximizing
insurers. They concluded that granting insurersmarket powermight benefit consumers
because this might trigger them to exert efforts to bring down the ex ante loss or the
probability with which such a loss occurs.
In this paper,we calculate for a number of settings the value of the profit-maximizing
loss probability. First we consider the expected-utility framework where we repeat the
analysis in Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) for an economy in which consumers are
endowed with CARA preferences and add the situation where consumers have CRRA
preferences. In both cases, the optimal loss probabilities only come close to zero if
consumers are highly risk averse (CARA) or are highly risk averse and face the risk
of losing a large fraction of their initial wealth (CRRA).
In the secondpart of the paper,weuse themore recent loss aversion theory to analyze
the insurer’s problem of finding the optimal loss probability in case the consumers
have reference-dependent preferences. We use the reference-dependent utility model
developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) to show that under the assumption of
linear consumption utility, the optimal loss probability is 0.5 when consumers have
CPE risk attitudes and between 0.4 and 0.5 when consumers have UPE risk attitudes
and a gain-loss coefficient of 2.25, a value often found in empirical studies.
Our overall conclusion therefore is that in most commonly used specifications, the
loss probability that maximizes a monopolistic insurer’s profits is closer to 1/2 than
to 0, independent of whether we adopt an expected-utility framework or take a more
behaviorial perspective. This value is higher thanmany of loss probabilities consumers
face for everyday risks. This implies that in evaluating the welfare effects of insurer
market power, policy makers should not limit attention to the possible gains from
increased insurer engagement in loss prevention activities but they should also eye the
possibility that the modification of loss probabilities moves in a direction detrimental
to consumer welfare.
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Appendix: Appendix with Proofs
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eθ L − 1
]
= 0 − 0 = 0.
Proof of Result 2
1. limθ→0 p∗(θ)
∣∣
δ=1 = 1 − e−1.




















1−θ (1 − θ) 1−θθ
W 1−θ
]
= 1 − lim
θ→0(1 − θ)
−1+1/θ
= 1 − lim
θ→0
(1 − θ)1/θ
1 − θ = 1 −
limθ→0(1 − θ)1/θ
limθ→0(1 − θ)
= 1 − lim
θ→0(1 − θ)
1/θ = 1 − lim
θ→0 e
ln(1−θ)/θ
= 1 − elimθ→0[ln(1−θ)/θ] = 1 − elimθ→0(−1/(1−θ))/1 = 1 − e−1,
(19)
where the second to last equality follows from application of L’Hôpital’s rule.
2. p∗(1/2) = 1/2.





/A1/θ =W 1−θ /A−
(





p∗(1/2) = ∗√W/A − (L/2)/A2 =
√






W − √W − L) − L/2
2(W − √W√W − L − L/2) = 1/2. (21)
The second to last equality follows by noting that
A2 = W + (W − L) − 2√W√W − L = 2(W − √W√W − L − L/2).
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3. limδ→1 p∗(θ) = 1 − (1 − θ) 1−θθ .















(W (1 − θ))1−θ
W 1−θ
)1/θ
= 1 − (1 − θ)(1−θ)/θ . (22)






















W 1−θ (1 − (1 − δ)1−θ )
= lim
δ→0
(1 − (1 − δ)1−θ ) 1θ −1 − (δ(1 − θ)) 1θ −1
(1 − (1 − δ)1−θ ) 1θ
.
Let f (δ) = (1 − δ)1−θ and its Taylor series at point δ = 0 is:
f (δ) = f (0) + f
′(0)
1! (δ − 0) +
f ′′(0)
2! (δ − 0)
2 + f
(3)(0)
3! (δ − 0)
3 + · · ·
= 1 − (1 − θ)δ − (1 − θ)θ
2
δ2 − (1 − θ)(1 + θ)θ
6
δ3 − · · · .
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] 1
θ
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whereas X = [1 + θ2 δ + (1+θ)θ6 δ2 + · · · ] and limδ→0 X = 1; and the result in step 4
is derived from step 3 by applying l’Hôpital’s rule.
Detailed Solution for the Insurer’s Optimization Problem Under UPE




π = R − pL
s.t. (1 − p)ηR + R − pL − pλη(L − R) ≤ 0.
The Lagrangian and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are the following:
L = R − pL − ξ [(1 − p)ηR + R − pL − pλη(L − R)] ,
∂L
∂ R
= 1 − ξ [η − pη + 1 + pλη] = 0,
∂L
∂p
= −L − ξ [−ηR − L − ληL + ληR] = 0,
ξ ≥ 0,
ξ [(1 − p)ηR + R − pL − pλη(L − R)] = 0.
Case 1 The constraint is not binding and ξ = 0. However, this is not admissible
because in that case ∂L
∂ R = 1 = 0.
Case 2 The constraint is binding. In this case the KKT conditions can be simplified
to
1 − ξ [η − pη + 1 + pλη] = 0,
− L − ξ [−ηR − L − ληL + ληR] = 0,
(1 − p)ηR + R − pL − pλη(L − R) = 0,
ξ > 0.
Solving these equations for p and R, one obtains:
p∗ =
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) − η − 1
η(λ − 1) ,
R(p∗) = L(1 + λη)
(√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) − η − 1)




1 + η .
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Since
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) − η − 1 > 0 when λ > 1, p∗ and R(p∗) are positive. The
expected profits per insuree equal
R(p∗) − p∗L =
(√
1 + λη
1 + η − 1
)
p∗L
which is positive for λ > 1 and η, L > 0.











2 [λ(1 + η) + 1 + λη]√











1 + λ + 2λη
2
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) −
√









The second term is positive because η > 0 and λ > 1. The first term is negative if and
only if
1 + λ + 2λη
2
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) −
√




⇔ η + λη + 2λη
2 − 2(1 + λη)(1 + η)
2η
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η) < −
1
η
⇔ η + λη + 2λη2 − 2(1 + λη)(1 + η) < −2
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η)
⇔ 2 + η(λ) > 2
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η), (25)
which holds because
2 + η(λ + 1) > 2(1 + λη) > 2
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η),
for λ > 1.
2. limη↓0 p∗ = 1/2.








λ − 1 =
1
2 (λ + 1) − 1
λ − 1 =
1
2λ − 12
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Detailed Solution for the Insurer’s Optimization Problem Under CPE




π = R − pL
s.t. (1 − p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1 − p)[2W − L + ηL − ληL] − W + R ≤ 0
The Lagrangian and the KKT conditions for this problem are the following:
L = R − pL − ξ((1 − p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1 − p)[2W − L + ηL
− ληL] − W + R),
∂L
∂ R
= 1 − ξ = 0,
∂L
∂p
= −L − ξ [−2W + 2pW + 2pW




(1 − p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1 − p)[2W − L + ηL − ληL] − W + R
]
= 0.
Case 1 The constraint is not binding and ξ = 0. However, this is not admissible
because in that case ∂L
∂ R = 1 = 0.
Case 2 The constraint is binding. In this case the KKT conditions can be simplified
to
ξ = 1,
L − 2W + 2pW + 2pW − 2pL + (1 − 2p)(2W − L + ηL − ληL) = 0,
(1 − p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1 − p)[2W − L + ηL − ληL] − W + R = 0.






+ η(λ − 1)L
4
.
R(p∗) is positive since λ > 1. These expected profits R(p∗) − p∗L are positive
because L2 + η(λ−1)L4 − L2 = η(λ−1)L4 > 0.
123
66 A. R. Soetevent, L. Zhou
References
Anderson, J. M., Nidhi, K., Stanley, K. D., Sorensen, P., Samaras, C., & Oluwatola, O. A. (2014).
Autonomous vehicle technology: A guide for policymakers. RAND Corporation. http://www.rand.
org/pubs/research/_reports/RR443-1.
Barberis, N. C. (2013). Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Winter, 27(1), 173–196.
Barseghyan, L., Molinari, F., O’Donoghue, T., & Teitelbaum, J. (2013). The nature of risk preferences:
Evidence from insurance choices. American Economic Review, 103(6), 2499–2529.
Bohnet, I., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2010). Trust and the reference points for trustworthiness in
Gulf and Western countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 811–828.
Brown, J., & Finkelstein, A. (2008). The interaction of public and private insurance: Medicaid and the
long-term insurance market. American Economic Review, 98(3), 1083–1102.
Carbajal, C. J. & Ely, J. C. (2014). AModel of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent
reference points. Theoretical Economics.
Cincinnati Financial Corporation. (2015). 2014 Annual Report on Form 10-K. http://www.annualreports.
com/Company/cincinnati-financial-corp.
Ehrlich, I., &Becker, G. S. (1972).Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection. Journal of Political
Economy, 80(4), 623–648.
Gill, D., & Prowse, V. (2012). A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition.
American Economic Review, 101(1), 469–503.
Gollier, J. K., Christian, H., & Treich, N. (2013). Risk and choice: A research saga. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 47, 129–145.
Hartley, R., Lanot, G., &Walker, I. (2014). Who really wants to be a millionaire? Estimates of risk aversion
from gameshow data. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 29(6), 861–879.
Heidhues, P., & Ko˝szegi, B. (2008). Competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse. The
American Economic Review, 98, 1245–1268.
Heidhues, P., & Ko˝szegi, B. (2014). Regular prices and sales. Theoretical Economics, 9(1), 217–251.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 92(5),
1644–1655.
Hu, W.-Y., & Scott, J. S. (2007). Behavioral obstacles in the annuity market. Financial Analysts Journal,
63, 71–82.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk”. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, 47, 263–291.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the
Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1325–1348.
Kaplan, G., & Violante, G. L. (2010). How much consumption insurance beyond self-insurance? American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(4), 53–87.
Ko˝szegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006). A model of reference-dependent preferences. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121(4), 1133–1165.
Ko˝szegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2007). Reference-dependent risk attitudes. The American Economic Review,
97(4), 1047–1073.
Ko˝szegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2009). Reference-dependent consumption plans. The American Economic
Review, 99(3), 909–936.
McKnight, R., Jonathan, R.,&Zitzewitz, E. (2012). Insurance as delegated purchasing: Theory and evidence
from health care. NBER working paper no. 17857.
Post, T., van den Assem, M. J., Baltussen, G., & Thaler, R. H. (2008). Deal or no deal? Decision making
under risk in a large-payoff game show. American Economic Review, 98(1), 38–71.
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econometrica, 68(5),
1281–1292.
Rabin, M., & Thaler, R. H. (2001). Risk aversion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), 219–232.
Samuelson, L. (2005). Economic theory and experimental economics. Journal of Economic Literature,
43(1), 65–107.
Schlesinger, H., & Venezian, E. C. (1986). Insurance maket with loss-prevention activitiy: Profits, market
structure, and consumer welfare. RAND Journal of Economics, Summer, 17(2), 227–238.
Schlesinger, H., & Venezian, E. C. (1990). Ex ante loss control by insurers: Public interest for higher profit.
Journal of Financial Services Research, 4(2), 83–92.
123
Loss Modification Incentives for Insurers Under Expected. . . 67
Sydnor, J. (2010). (Over) insuring modest risks. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(4),
177–199.
The Economist. (2015). From horseless to driverless: If autonomous vehicles rule the world. The Economist,
15–16.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncer-
tainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
Wakker, P. P. (2008). Explaining the characteristics of the power (CRRA) utility family. Health Economics,
17(12), 1329–1344.
123
